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INTRODUCTION
Henry is a repairman who works for a railroad. One day, as a re-
sult of the railroad's negligence, a boiler begins to overheat and
Henry is called on to fix it. While working, Henry becomes uncom-
fortably hot and removes his coat. After finishing his work, he reach-
es for a thermos of coffee but accidentally spills it on his arm, causing
severe burns. If Henry had been wearing his coat, it would have
prevented him from being burned. Is the railroad liable for Henry's
injuries?'
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act2 (FELA), railroads
are liable to their employees for injuries caused "in whole or in part"
by the railroad's negligence.3 Rather than establishing a workers'
compensation system, FELA requires railroad employees to sue
through the traditional tort system to recover for workplace injuries
but eliminates common law barriers such as assumption of risk that
made it difficult for employee-plaintiffs to recover in common law
courts.' This means that employees hoping to recover for a work-
place injury still have the burden of proving the traditional elements
of a tort suit: duty, breach, causation, and damages.
Henry might bring suit against the railroad to recover for his in-
juries, arguing that but for the fact that the overheating boiler caused
him to remove his coat, he would not have been burned by the cof-
fee. He would claim that the railroad's negligent maintenance of the
boiler caused his injury "in whole or in part."
A court applying common law proximate cause would likely re-
ject this sort of claim. Proximate cause allows courts to cut off the
t BA 2010, University of Kentucky; JD Candidate 2013, The University of Chicago Law
School.
I For the source of this hypothetical, see CSX Transportation, Inc v McBride, 131 S Ct
2630, 2652 (2011) (Roberts dissenting).
2 Pub L No 60-100, ch 149, 35 Stat 65 (1908), codified as amended at 45 USC § 51 et seq.
3 45 USC § 51.
4 See 45 USC §§ 53-55. See also Consolidated Rail Corp v Gottshall, 512 US 532, 542
(1994); Melissa Sandoval Greenidge, Comment, Getting the Train on the Right Track: A Mod-
ern Proposal for Changes to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 41 McGeorge L Rev 407,
409-10 (2010).
1513
The University of Chicago Law Review
chain of causation when an injury appears too attenuated, too un-
foreseeable, or too unnatural to justify holding the defendant liable.'
Without a limit, a negligent act could create virtually unlimited liabil-
ity for a defendant through an endless chain of but-for causation.
Imagine a defendant-employer negligently starts a fire in the morn-
ing. The firemen extinguish the fire by lunch, but not before the fire
spreads to the sandwich shop next door. Because the defendant's
employees cannot eat lunch at the sandwich shop, they drive to a res-
taurant three miles down the road. On their way, the car breaks
down and the employees get in a wreck and sustain severe injuries.
But for the negligently created fire, the employees would not have
been driving and would not have gotten into a wreck. The chain of
causation is clear-one event leads to another, which leads to anoth-
er-but imposing liability on the employer for the car wreck because
of the negligently created fire seems absurd. Proximate cause allows
courts to deny liability in cases involving such attenuated chains of
causation.
For the first fifty years after FELA's enactment, plaintiffs were
required to prove that their injuries were proximately caused by the
railroad's negligence.' In Rogers v Missouri Pacific Railroad Co,7 the
Supreme Court cast doubt on whether proximate cause is the appro-
priate standard of causation for cases arising under FELA.' In 2011,
the Supreme Court in CSX Transportation, Inc v McBride' cleared
the record and held that traditional proximate cause is not the stand-
ard under FELA and that courts should apply a more "relaxed"
standard of causation in these cases.' The McBride Court held that
the appropriate test of causation under FELA is whether the rail-
road's negligence "played any part, even the slightest" in causing the
employee's injury. Under this test, the defendant-railroad can be
held liable "no matter how small" the causal connection might be."
Based on this language, would the railroad be liable for Henry's
burns? Did its negligence "play any part, even the slightest" in bring-
ing about his injury? In McBride, the Court rejected the suggestion
5 See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Forms and Functions of Tort Law 124-25 (Foundation
3d ed 2007) ("[T]he doctrine of proximate cause operates as a limitation on the scope of the
defendant's liability.").
6 See New York Central Railroad Co v Ambrose, 280 US 486, 489-90 (1930) (overturn-
ing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff where the plaintiff failed to prove the injuries were proxi-
mately caused by the railroad's negligence).
7 352 US 500 (1957).
8 Id at 506.
9 131 S Ct 2630 (2011).
10 Id at 2634-36.
11 Id at 2636.
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that a railroad would be liable for such far-fetched claims, reasoning
that courts can simply apply their "common sense" to bar recovery in
cases involving attenuated causal chains. The language of the Court's
holding, however, provides limited guidance as to when and why
courts should deny such claims. If a plaintiff need only show that the
defendant's negligence played any part, no matter how small, in caus-
ing an injury, it is unclear how courts can consistently and permissi-
bly limit an otherwise limitless causal chain.
This Comment articulates how courts should approach questions
about causation after McBride. Part I outlines the history of the
standard of causation under FELA and how it evolved from proxi-
mate cause to the current standard. In Part II, this Comment exam-
ines the majority opinion in McBride. Part III then looks at the ways
in which courts have responded to McBride. Here it is argued that
two interrelated problems have arisen. First, the opinion's reliance
on a "common sense constraint" provides little guidance for courts in
determining the point at which liability should be cut off. Second,
and more problematic, the McBride Court's statements about the
role of foreseeability have led some courts to adopt a form of "free-
standing negligence," leading to potentially limitless liability.
Finally, in Part IV, this Comment offers an interpretation of
FELA's "relaxed" standard of causation that prevents limitless
chains of causation. Drawing on common law doctrines developed in
cases of coincidental harm, this Comment argues that the relaxed
standard of causation allows courts to limit liability for harms that
lack a "causal link" to the railroad's negligence. By engaging in a
causal-link analysis, courts can comfortably exclude a significant por-
tion of the more far-fetched cases where, as the McBride Court not-
ed, common sense demands severing liability.
I. THE FELA STANDARD OF CAUSATION OVER TIME
FELA was enacted in 19082 as an effort to relieve railroad
employees of harsh common law doctrines that often prevented
recovery for on-the-job injuries." The Act provides that "[e]very
common carrier by railroad.., shall be liable in damages to any
12 The first version of FELA was enacted in 1906. See Pub L No 59-219, ch 3073, 34 Stat
232 (1906). The 1906 Act was struck down under the Commerce Clause. See The Employers'
Liability Cases, 207 US 463, 499 (1908). The statute was retooled to withstand constitutional
challenges and enacted in 1908. See Pub L No 60-100, ch 149, 35 Stat 65 (1908), codified as
amended at 45 USC § 51 et seq.
13 See Thomas E. Baker, Why Congress Should Repeal the Federal Employers' Liability
Act of 1908, 29 Harv J Leg 79, 81-82 (1992).
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person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier.""1 Rail-
road work was incredibly dangerous," but common law doctrines
such as the fellow-servant rule,'6 contributory negligence,'7 and as-
sumption of risk" made it difficult for railroad workers to recover for
work-related injuries. " FELA explicitly abrogated these barriers so
that injured railroad employees would have a better chance of
recovery.'0
FELA, however, did not create a workers' compensation system
but instead worked within the tort system.' The difference is signifi-
cant. Under a typical workers' compensation system, employees
agree to accept a predetermined amount of compensation for work-
related injuries in exchange for forfeiting the right to sue their em-
ployers.22 This accomplishes two things: First, employers enjoy lim-
ited liability and avoid unpredictable costs of litigation in favor of
predictable costs paid into the workers' compensation program. Se-
cond, employees no longer have the burden of proving fault and are
oftentimes compensated more quickly.'
A plaintiff hoping to recover for a work-related injury under
FELA, however, still has to prove the traditional elements of duty,
breach, causation, and damages. Rather than creating a no-fault
insurance program, FELA simply creates a statutory tort scheme for
railroad employees in which they retain traditional burdens.'
14 45 USC § 51.
15 See Baker, 29 Harv J Leg at 81 (cited in note 13) ("[T]he average life expectancy of a
switchman was seven years, and a brakeman's chance of dying from natural causes was less
than one in five.").
16 The fellow-servant rule holds that employees, with regard to actions against their em-
ployers, consent to the risk that their fellow employees might harm them "by virtue of their
common employment." Richard A. Epstein, Torts § 8.7.1 at 204 (Aspen 1999).
17 Contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery no matter the percentage of the
plaintiff's fault. See id at § 8.1 at 188-89.
18 Assumption of risk bars recovery where the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily as-
sumed the risks of the dangerous activity in which he was engaged when he was injured. See id
at § 8.6 at 198-203.
19 See Baker, 29 Harv J Leg at 81-82 (cited in note 13).
20 45 USC §§ 51-52 (fellow-servant rule); 45 USC § 53 (contributory negligence); 45 USC
§ 54 (assumption of risk). See also Baker, 29 Harv J Leg at 82 (cited in note 13).
21 See Baker, 29 Harv J Leg at 82-83 (cited in note 13).
22 See Ishita Sengupta, Virginia Reno, and John F. Burton Jr, Workers' Compensation:
Benefits, Coverage, and Costs, 2004 6 (National Academy of Social Insurance July 2006), online
at http://www.nasi.org/usr-doc/NASI-WorkersComp-2004.pdf (visited Nov 24, 2012).
23 See id (explaining that "a worker who sustained an occupational injury or disease ...
receive[s] predictable compensation without delay, irrespective of who was at fault").
24 See Rogers, 352 US at 508. See also Hardyman v Norfolk & Western Railway Co, 243
F3d 255, 258 (6th Cir 2001); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 US 1, 4 (1912) (noting that
the complaint in this case was that "the injuries proximately resulted from negligence of the
plaintiff's fellow servants").
Are Railroads Liable When Lightning Strikes?
According to the Act, plaintiffs may recover when their injuries
were caused "in whole or in part" by the railroad's negligence.' Since
FELA's enactment, the Court's understanding of what it means to
cause an injury "in whole or in part" has evolved. This Part explores
three significant periods in the statute's history: the first fifty years of
FELA, the Supreme Court's opinion in Rogers, and the post-Rogers
period.
A. Causation in the First Fifty Years of FELA
For the first fifty years following FELA's enactment, courts ap-
plied traditional proximate cause in cases arising under the Act. Ini-
tially, courts were not preoccupied with the appropriate standard of
causation. It was assumed that proximate cause, which was the
standard of causation for traditional tort law, was the standard for
torts arising under FELA." For instance, in 1916 the Supreme Court
held "that in order for the plaintiff to recover in [a FELA action] he
must prove ... that the injuries he sustained were the direct and
proximate result of the negligence of the defendant."'2 Again in 1930
the Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff "completely failed to
prove that the accident was proximately due to the negligence of the
company.., the verdict.., can not be allowed to stand."' The case
law during the first half of the twentieth century unequivocally
demonstrates the use of proximate cause in FELA actions."
The Supreme Court's seemingly unquestioned application of
proximate cause in FELA suits was likely due to the text of the stat-
ute itself. As noted above, FELA explicitly abrogated several tradi-
tional common law doctrines, including the fellow-servant rule,
contributory negligence, and assumption of risk.' The fact that some
common law doctrines were explicitly abrogated by FELA most like-
ly led courts to believe that other common law doctrines within tort
law were intended to be left alone. In 1994, the Supreme Court held
25 45 USC § 51.
26 See Baker, 29 Harv J Leg at 83 (cited in note 13) ("The Supreme Court's early ap-
proach to interpreting the FELA was to rely on traditional concepts of fault and proximate
causation.").
27 Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co v Carnahan, 241 US 241,244 (1916).
28 New York Central Railroad Co v Ambrose, 280 US 486, 489-90 (1930).
29 See, for example, Northwestern Pacific Railroad Co v Bobo, 290 US 499, 503 (1934)
(denying causation by noting that "there is nothing whatsoever to show that [the railroad's
negligence] was the proximate cause of the unfortunate death"); Raudenbush v Baltimore &
Ohio R.R., 63 F Supp 329, 332 (ED Pa 1945), revd 160 F2d 363 (3d Cir 1947) ("Under [FELA],
the carrier is liable only where its negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries to its em-
ployee, or his death.").
30 45 USC §§ 51-54.
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that such a line of analysis was appropriate: "[A]lthough common-
law principles are not necessarily dispositive of questions arising un-
der FELA, unless they are expressly rejected in the text of the stat-
ute, they are entitled to great weight in our analysis."" In other
words, the Court held that common law doctrines that would typical-
ly apply are still relevant under FELA if they are. not explicitly abro-
gated by statute. If the purpose of FELA was to keep railroad injury
claims within the domain of tort law, then the logical move for courts
interpreting the statute was to apply traditional tort law doctrines
unless explicitly told otherwise.
The first wrinkle in the doctrine might be traced to 1943. In
Brady v Southern Railway Co,32 the Supreme Court again affirmed
that proximate cause was the appropriate standard under FELA.'
The Brady Court denied liability for lack of negligence and in doing
so acknowledged that proximate cause was the applicable standard
of causation. Here the Court defined proximate cause as requiring
that "the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the
negligence or wrongful act, and that it ought to have been foreseen
in the light of the attending circumstances.""
Not every member of the Court agreed with the ruling in Brady.
Justice Hugo Black dissented, arguing not only that there was rea-
sonable proof of negligence but also that such negligence proximate-
ly caused Brady's death." However, his definition of "proximate
cause" would give pause to anyone familiar with the traditional
concept:
Surely this rail was the "proximate cause" if those words be
used to mean an event which contributes to produce a result,
which is the meaning Congress intended when it made railroads
liable for the injury or death of an employee "due to" or "result-
ing in whole or in part from" the railroad's negligence."
While it is certainly true that "proximate cause" is a complicated
and often amorphous doctrine,"' Justice Black's suggested definition
is exactly what proximate cause is not. Proximate cause exists
31 Consolidated Rail Corp v Gottshall, 512 US 532, 544 (1994).
32 320 US 476 (1943).
33 Id at 483 ("The rule as to when a directed verdict is proper, heretofore referred to, is
applicable to questions of proximate cause.").
34 Id at 478-84.
35 Idat483.
36 Brady, 320 US at 485-89 (Black dissenting).
37 Id at 488-89.
38 See Archer v Warner, 538 US 314, 326 (2003); E.H. Schopler, Tests of Causation under
Federal Employers' Liability Act or Jones Act, 98 ALR2d 653, § 2 (1964).
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because liability for purely but-for causation is unacceptable, and a
standard that only asks whether an action "contributes to produce a
result" leads to such but-for liability."
Why did Justice Black offer such an unorthodox conception of
proximate cause? One explanation might be that Justice Black
viewed proximate cause as context-dependent-a position later
adopted by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.' Justice Black might have
been implicitly arguing that in the context of FELA proximate cause
should be understood in a way that tracks the statutory text more
closely than the traditional common law definition.
Whatever his reasoning, Justice Black offered a definition of
proximate cause in Brady that sharply departed from the majority's
routine application of the common law. Although he gave the ap-
pearance of merely applying the same standard of causation that
courts had been applying for years, Justice Black's conception of
proximate cause looks more like the groundwork for the relaxed
standard the Court later adopted, which was explicitly not traditional
common law proximate cause.
B. The Rogers Standard: "Played Any Part, Even the Slightest"
Traditional proximate cause was the standard used by courts in-
terpreting FELA for fifty years, but in 1957, less than fifteen years
after Justice Black's dissent in Brady, the Supreme Court revisited its
understanding of causation in Rogers v Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.
In Rogers, the Court rejected the argument that FELA required
a plaintiff to show that the railroad's negligence was "the sole, effi-
cient, producing cause of injury."" The significant holding of the
Court was that under FELA "the test of a jury case is simply whether
the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negli-
gence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or
death for which damages are sought."'2
The facts in Rogers were fairly simple. The plaintiff worked for
the railroad and on the day of the injury was responsible for burning
the vegetation on the sides of the tracks. Every once in a while a
train would pass, and the plaintiff was required to move a safe
39 See Palsgraf v Long Island R. Co, 162 NE 99, 103 (NY 1928) (Andrews dissenting)
("An overturned lantern may burn all Chicago. We may follow the fire from the shed to the
last building. We rightly say the fire started by the lantern caused its destruction. A cause, but
not the proximate cause.").
40 See notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
41 Rogers, 352 US at 506.
42 Id (emphasis added).
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distance from the track and watch the train for "hotboxes"-
overheated wheel bearings that could lead to a fire. On one occasion,
the plaintiff saw that a train was approaching and ran to a spot where
he could watch for hotboxes. While he was watching, "he became
enveloped in smoke and flames" caused by the passing train, which
fanned the flames he had set to the shrubbery beside the tracks.'3 He
turned to run but tripped and fell off a culvert, suffering serious injury."
The plaintiff alleged that the railroad was negligent in requiring
him to work in such close proximity to the tracks, where passing
trains would fan the flames and smoke in his direction, and in main-
taining the culvert where he was required to stand. These negligent
actions by the railroad, according to the plaintiff, caused his injuries.'
As noted above, the Court held that the plaintiff need not prove
the railroad's negligence was the sole and efficient cause of his inju-
ry, only that it "played any part, even the slightest" in causing the in-
jury.' The issue in Rogers was how multiple causes should be treated
under FELA. The lower court employed a test whereby causation
was denied whenever more than one cause could be reasonably at-
tributed to the injury-a test the Rogers Court referred to as requir-
ing the railroad's negligence to be the "sole, efficient, producing
cause of the injury." 7 That is, because a jury could reasonably
conclude that the injury resulted either from the railroad's negli-
gence or from the plaintiff's negligence, the lower court denied cau-
sation altogether. In Rogers, the Court explicitly rejected this meth-
od of determining causation. Instead, it held that the presence of
multiple causes does not justify keeping a case from the jury."
Despite primarily addressing a question about multiple causa-
tion, the Rogers Court made a number of declarations that puzzled
43 Id at 502.
44 Rogers, 352 US at 501-03.
45 Id at 502-03.
16 Id at 506.
,47 Id at 506-07. The "sole efficient cause" test was applied by courts to deny liability
when the plaintiff's actions could be attributed as the only cause of the injury. To make this
determination, a court would ask whether the accident would still have happened if the party
had not engaged in a particular act of negligence, and if not, the court would deny liability. See
Southern Railway Co v Youngblood, 286 US 313, 317 (1932) (denying liability because accident
would not have happened but for the plaintiff's disobedience of an order). The theory of sole
causation arose from courts denying liability whenever the plaintiff's act came after the de-
fendant's, on the grounds that only the "nearest" cause could constitute the proximate cause.
This was replaced in the mid-nineteenth century by the doctrine of contributory negligence-
which was also a complete bar to recovery at common law-on the fear that plaintiffs were not
being held responsible for their negligence simply because it preceded a negligent act by the
defendant. See Epstein, Torts § 8.1 at 188 (cited in note 16).
48 Rogers, 352 US at 506-08.
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lower courts. In addition to the "played any part, even the slightest"
language, the court went on to say that FELA cases "rarely present[]
more than the single question whether negligence of the employer
played any part, however small, in the injury or death which is the
subject of the suit."'" Further, the Court held that a case should go to
a jury where "the conclusion may be drawn that the negligence of
the employer played any part at all in the injury or death.'"
These declarations by the Rogers Court called into question
what standard of causation courts should generally apply in FELA
cases. A narrow interpretation of Rogers would find the Court's lan-
guage applicable only to questions of multiple causation. That is, the
"played any part, even the slightest" standard was not meant to relax
the proximate cause analysis in general but rather only to do away
with the multiple-cause barrier that traditional proximate cause
might create. A broader interpretation of Rogers, however, would
mean that the Court's holding introduced a more relaxed version of
causation generally. Under this interpretation, the "played any part,
even the slightest" standard would replace traditional proximate
cause completely. Which way to interpret Rogers-narrowly or
broadly-perplexed lower courts in the years following the decision.
C. After Rogers: Fifty Years of Confusion
After the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Rogers,
lower courts split over its application." Many courts continued to ap-
ply a traditional proximate cause standard in FELA cases. In Dicker-
son v Staten Trucking, Inc," the court held that the plaintiff's claim
failed as a matter of law because he failed to show that the negli-
gence proximately caused the injuries." In Snipes v Chicago, Central
& Pacific Railroad Co," the Iowa Supreme Court noted that plain-
tiffs must prove traditional proximate causation when bringing
FELA suits."
Other courts, however, began applying a more relaxed standard
of causation after Rogers. In Summers v Missouri Pacific Railroad
System," the Tenth Circuit noted that federal courts of appeals had
held that instructing juries to apply traditional proximate cause in
49 Id at 508.
50 Idat507.
51 See Greenidge, Comment, 41 McGeorge L Rev at 417 (cited in note 4).
52 428 F Supp 2d 909 (ED Ark 2006).
53 Idat915.
54 484 NW2d 162 (Iowa 1992).
55 Id at 164.
56 132 F3d 599 (10th Cir 1997).
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FELA cases is reversible error." In 2003, the Sixth Circuit applied a
relaxed standard of causation in Richards v Consolidated Rail Corp."
Relying on Rogers, the court allowed a conductor to recover on a re-
laxed standard of causation when he hurt his back while checking the
brakes on a train. In doing so, the court explicitly noted that the
standard of causation was relaxed after the "landmark decision" of
Rogers.'
D. Norfolk Southern Railway Co v Sorrell: The Supreme Court
Weighs In
Five decades after Justice William Brennan penned the Rogers
opinion, the Supreme Court weighed in on the question lower courts
had been wrestling with: What is the appropriate standard of causa-
tion for FELA suits? In a pair of dueling concurrences, Justice David
Souter and Justice Ginsburg each outlined what they believed was
the answer, foreshadowing the high court's ruling on the issue four
years later.
In Norfolk Southern Railway Co v Sorrell," the Court granted
certiorari to decide whether the standard of causation under FELA
should be the same for determining the employer's liability as it is
for determining the liability of the employee due to contributory
negligence.' The Court held that the standards for assessing the
damages caused by the railroad's negligence and the employee's
contributory negligence are the same' but declined to decide wheth-
er traditional proximate cause or a more relaxed standard is appro-
priate in FELA cases.'
A concurrence written by Justice Souter, joined by Justices An-
tonin Scalia and Samuel Alito, argued that "Rogers did not address,
much less alter, existing law governing the degree of causation" re-
quired under FELA' Justice Souter noted that Rogers only ad-
dressed "how to proceed when there are multiple cognizable causes
57 Id at 607, citing Hausrath v New York Central Railroad Co, 401 F2d 634, 636-37 (6th
Cir 1968), DeLima v Trinidad Corp, 302 F2d 585, 587-88 (2d Cir 1962), and Hoyt v Central
Railroad, 243 F2d 840, 843 (3d Cir 1957).
58 330 F3d 428 (6th Cir 2003).
59 Id at 431,437.
60 Id at 433.
61 549 US 158 (2007).
62 See id at 164-65; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Norfolk Southern Railway Co v Sor-
rell, No 05-746, *1 (US filed Dec 7, 2005) (available on Westlaw at 2005 WL 3369162).
63 Sorrell, 549 US at 171.
64 Idat 164.
65 Id at 173 (Souter concurring).
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of an injury" and left alone the standard of causation already applied
by courts.'
According to Justice Souter, the standard left alone by Rogers
was proximate cause." The rationale here was fairly straightforward.
Before FELA, Justice Souter argued, "it was clear common law that
a plaintiff had to prove that a defendant's negligence caused his inju-
ry proximately," and the text of FELA does not explicitly abrogate
this common law rule.' Because FELA expressly abrogated some
common law doctrines, Justice Souter argued, courts should continue
to apply those like traditional proximate cause that were not abro-
gated by statute. In fact, Justice Souter argued that Supreme Court
precedent demanded the assumption that non-abrogated common
law doctrines apply in FELA cases."
Justice Souter explained that the confusion post-Rogers was
based on a lack of clarity.7" When the Rogers Court created the
"played any part, even the slightest" test, it failed to concretely ex-
plain that the test was applicable only when determining how liabil-
ity should be apportioned when there is a "multiplicity of causa-
tions."' While Justice Souter admitted that the Rogers opinion could
have done a better job expressing this, the fact that Rogers relied
on case law explicitly requiring proximate cause was sufficient to
establish an "absence of any intent [by the Rogers Court] to water
down the common law requirement of proximate cause."72
Justice Ginsburg also concurred in Sorrell, disagreeing sharply
with Justice Souter about what the standard of causation under
FELA actually is. Drawing on two earlier cases, Justice Ginsburg ar-
gued that the Supreme Court had already held that Rogers estab-
lished a more relaxed standard of causation in FELA suits.3 The Sor-
rell majority, Justice Ginsburg wrote, left in place the "played any
66 Id.
67 Sorrell, 549 US at 173-74 (Souter concurring).
68 Id.
69 Id at 174. Justice Souter pointed to more than one Supreme Court case establishing
this principle whereby courts assume that common law doctrines apply if they are not expressly
abrogated by the text of FELA. Id, citing Norfolk & Western Railway Co v Ayers, 538 US 135,
145 (2003), Gottshall, 512 US at 544, and Second Employers' Liability Cases, 233 US 1, 49-50
(1912).
70 Sorrell, 549 US at 175 (Souter concurring).
71 Id.
72 Id at 175-76.
73 Id at 177 (Ginsburg concurring), citing Gottshall, 512 US at 543 and Crane v Cedar
Rapids & Iowa City Railway Co, 395 US 164,166 (1969).
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part, even the slightest" test that federal courts had been applying
for fifty years."
Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg disclaimed the notion that the re-
laxed standard under Rogers is an elimination of proximate cause."5
Rather, she argued that proximate cause is necessarily a context-
dependent formulation and that the Rogers standard is simply the
appropriate version of proximate cause in the context of FELA
suits. 6 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Ginsburg argued that prox-
imate cause is "a judgment, at least in part policy based," and that
"strong policy considerations" are behind the causation standard un-
der FELA." Here she recounted the familiar story behind FELA-
that it was enacted so that the costs of the dangerous railroad indus-
try would be shared in part by the railroad and not just its employ-
ees-and argued that out of this context arose the "far less exacting"
standard suggested in Rogers.' According to Justice Ginsburg, Rog-
ers held that "[w]henever a railroad's negligence is the slightest cause
of the plaintiff's injury, it is the legal [proximate] cause, for which the
railroad is properly held responsible.
79
II. THE CONSTRAINTS OF COMMON SENSE: THE CAUSATION
STANDARD UNDER MCBRIDE
Four years after Sorrell, the Supreme Court tackled the standard
of causation question once and for all. Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Ginsburg adopted the standard she had outlined in her concur-
rence in Sorrell.'
A. Fighting over Jury Instructions
McBride was a locomotive engineer who suffered a hand injury,
which he claimed was caused by the railroad's negligence in requir-
ing him to use an unsafe hand switch and failing to properly train
him to use the equipment.'
74 Sorrell, 549 US at 177-78.
75 Id at 178.
76 Id ("It would be more accurate, as I see it, to recognize that Rogers describes the test
for proximate causation applicable in FELA suits.").
77 Id at 178-79.
78 Sorrell, 549 US at 179 (Ginsburg concurring).
79 Id at 180 (substituting the term "legal cause" for "proximate cause" in an effort to re-
duce confusion about what the concept requires).
80 See McBride, 131 S Ct at 2636 ("[W]e conclude that [FELA] does not incorporate
'proximate cause' standards developed in nonstatutory common law tort actions.").
81 Idat2635.
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By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, however, the
real fight in McBride was over jury instructions. The jury instructions
given by the district court read, "Defendant 'caused or contributed
to' Plaintiff's injury if Defendant's negligence played a part-no mat-
ter how small-in bringing about the injury. The mere fact that an
injury occurred does not necessarily mean that the injury was caused
by negligence."'
The railroad, CSX, argued that these jury instructions suggested
nothing more than but-for causation was required while in fact the
appropriate standard was proximate cause.' CSX asked the district
court to provide jury instructions requiring "the plaintiff [to] show
that... the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the in-
jury." A second set of instructions "would have defined 'proximate
cause' to mean 'any cause which, in natural or probable sequence,
produced the injury complained of,' with the qualification that a
proximate cause 'need not be the only cause nor the last or nearest
cause."'" McBride, on the other hand, argued that the jury instruc-
tions were perfectly consistent with the relaxed standard of causation
articulated in Rogers. Ultimately, the trial court used McBride's pro-
posed jury instructions on the grounds that they adhered to the re-
laxed standard of causation under Rogers and that traditional proxi-
mate causation was not the appropriate standard under FELA.'
The crux of CSX's argument was that the jury instruction should
incorporate the traditional concept of proximate cause and that, alt-
hough there are multiple ways that jury instructions can achieve this
result, the instructions given in this case required nothing more than
a showing of but-for causation. As an example used while arguing
before the Supreme Court, CSX suggested the "natural, probable,
and foreseeable" instruction.'
B. The Relaxed Standard Prevails
The Supreme Court ultimately adopted Rogers's relaxed stand-
ard of causation. Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg's ra-
tionale in McBride tracked her concurrence in Sorrell, which in turn
82 Id.
83 Brief for Petitioner, CSX Transportation, Inc v McBride, No 10-235, *50 (US filed Jan
13, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 141225).
84 McBride, 131 S Ct at 2635.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Transcript of Oral Argument, CSX Transportation, Inc v McBride, No 10-235, *9-10
(US Mar 28, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 1114431).
20121 1525
The University of Chicago Law Review
tracked the analysis that courts had used in applying a relaxed stand-
ard of causation after Rogers.
In addition to the arguments already discussed, Justice Ginsburg
made two claims that are worth reviewing here. First, Justice Gins-
burg clarified the role of foreseeability under FELA. Second, Justice
Ginsburg argued that "common sense" acts as an implicit constraint
to prevent the relaxed standard of causation from collapsing into
purely but-for causation. The following Subsections review these
points in turn.
1. The McBride standard and foreseeability.
In explaining the relaxed standard of causation, the majority in
McBride also expounded on the role of foreseeability in FELA cases.
Drawing on the previous Supreme Court case Gallick v Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co,' the McBride Court noted that "foreseeability of
harm" is still a component of negligence under FELA cases, but that
when assessing causation, the manner and extent of harm need not be
foreseeable for liability to attach."
In Gallick, the railroad allowed a stagnant pool of water to fes-
ter and attract bugs. The plaintiff, who was required to work near
this pool of water, was bitten by an insect. This led to an infection,
which resulted in the amputation of both of his legs. The Court held
the railroad negligent and relied on the fact that the harm of an in-
sect bite was a reasonably foreseeable risk of allowing the pool of
stagnant water to fester." Because the harm was reasonably foresee-
able, the Court did not engage in a discussion as to whether the
manner or extent of harm was also foreseeable.
Building on Gallick, the Court in McBride held that although
foreseeability remains a part of a court's negligence analysis under
FELA, it should not be used for determining causation. This holding
gave pause to the dissent, which feared that eliminating foreseeabil-
ity means that the only causal relationship required is that the negli-
gent act be the but-for cause of the injury." The dissent believed that
this created a standard whereby the railroad could be held liable for
any harm that was caused by the negligent act-creating the poten-
tial for limitless liability. This potential problem, as described by the
dissent, is examined further below.
88 372 US 108 (1963).
89 McBride, 131 S Ct at 2643.
90 Gallick, 372 US at 117-19.
91 McBride, 131 S Ct at 2645 (Roberts dissenting).
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2. The "constraints of common sense" as an implicit limit on
liability.
Chief Justice John Roberts, with Justices Antonin Scalia, An-
thony Kennedy, and Samuel Alito, dissented, arguing that the rule
announced by the Court created a standard that is nothing more than
but-for causation.' According to the dissent, the terms "even the
slightest" and "no matter how small" indicate to a jury "that even
the faintest whisper of 'but for' causation will do." 3 As Chief Justice
Roberts explained,
At oral argument, counsel for McBride explained that the cor-
rect standard for recovery under FELA is "but-for plus a re-
laxed form of legal cause." There is no "plus" in the rule the
Court announces today. In this very case, defense counsel was
free to argue "but for" cause pure and simple to the jury: "What
we also have to show is defendant's negligence caused or con-
tributed to [McBride's] injury. It never would have happened
but for [CSX] giving him that train."'
Rejecting the dissent's fear of limitless liability, the McBride
Court noted that common sense acts as an implicit constraint in
FELA cases." According to the majority it is "standard practice in
FELA cases" for juries to be instructed to use common sense in de-
termining whether causation exists.' By using common sense, "ju-
ries would have no warrant to award damages in far out 'but for'
scenarios," and "judges would have no warrant to submit such cases
to the jury. ""
The Court pointed to two cases as examples of when common
sense should limit liability in a FELA case. Nicholson v Erie Rail-
road Co' was decided in 1958 and was one of the first decisions that
applied a relaxed standard of causation based on Rogers." There, a
female employee of the railroad worked in the Jersey Avenue Car
Shops, which did not have a women's restroom. Because the shop
did not have a women's restroom, the employee was forced to go to
the yard and use a restroom on one of the trains. On the day the in-
jury occurred, the employee boarded an empty train to use the
92 Id.
93 Id at 2647.
94 Id (citations omitted).
95 McBride, 131 S Ct at 2643 (majority).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 253 F2d 939 (2d Cir 1958).
99 Id at 940.
15272012]
The University of Chicago Law Review
restroom. When she finished, the train had started moving and pas-
sengers were hopping on and off. Once the train came to a stop, she
reached for her purse and pocketbook and "was then struck by
something carried by one of the passengers who had previously
boarded the train. She fell and was injured."''
Before reaching its decision under the Rogers standard, the
court assumed that failing to provide a women's lavatory could be
considered negligent."' The court held that "it cannot be denied
that.., failure to supply toilet facilities 'played a part' in producing
plaintiff's injury.." 2 Despite both of these observations, the court de-
nied causation under the relaxed Rogers standard because even un-
der the relaxed standard of causation, "[t]he fault would be too far
removed both in space and time from the injury.""3 The Court in
McBride offered this case as an example of a court keeping the issue
from the jury when there was nothing more than but-for causation."'
A second case the McBride Court relied on was Moody v Bos-
ton and Maine Corp."" In Moody, the plaintiff alleged that the rail-
road's negligent overworking of her husband caused him to have a
heart attack." Because the plaintiff's injury resulted from general
work-related stress and not the specific negligent act of requiring
him to work overtime, the court found a lack of causation under
FELA."'7 Justice Ginsburg pointed to Moody and noted that "judges
[ ] have no warrant to submit such cases to the jury," even under the
relaxed standard of causation."'"
In further support of its common sense constraint, the McBride
majority noted that neither the dissent nor the defendant were able
to uncover a case where the jury reached an absurd result based on
the instructions, which allegedly allowed them to find liability based
on but-for causation. ' Given that the jury instructions endorsed by
the Court in McBride had been used for years, the Court found it
unconvincing when the dissent "conjur[ed] up images of falling pian-




102 Nicholson, 253 F2d at 941.
103 Id.
104 McBride, 131 S Ct at 2643, citing Nicholson, 253 F2d at 940-41.
105 921 F2d 1 (1st Cir 1990).
106 Id at 2-3.
107 Id at 5.
108 McBride, 131 S Ct at 2643-44, citing Moody, 921 F2d at 2-5.
109 McBride, 131 S Ct at 2641.
110 Id.
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III. AFTER MCBRIDE: AMBIGUITIES UNRESOLVED
A. Courts Wrestle with the Relaxed Standard
McBride was decided only recently, so it is unsurprising that on-
ly a few courts have discussed and applied its ruling. A few recent
cases, however, offer a glimpse into how courts will apply the relaxed
standard of causation after McBride.
1. Niederhofer and the remoteness test.
The court in Niederhofer v Illinois Central Railroad Co.' applied
the relaxed standard of causation shortly after McBride. This case
provides an illustrative example of how a court might apply a "com-
mon sense constraint." The plaintiff in Niederhofer was operating a
repair truck as part of his duties as a "car man" when he collided
with a railroad car due to accumulated snow and ice on the ground."'
The accident itself was a "very minor fender bender," and neither
the plaintiff nor the other passenger in the truck was harmed."' After
the truck came to a complete stop, Niederhofer decided to call his
supervisor to tell him about the accident. While on the phone, he ex-
ited the truck using its two exterior steps. Normally, the second step
is approximately twenty inches from the ground, but because of the
angle of the truck after the crash, the step was only approximately
eight inches from the ground. Niederhofer was not paying attention
when he stepped down and jammed his knee due to the shorter dis-
tance. He did not slip on any snow or ice; his injury was solely due to
the fact that the second step was closer to the ground than he ex-
pected."'
The negligence alleged against the railroad was a failure to clear
the accumulated snow and ice from the ground. This negligence, ac-
cording to the court, was "sufficiently disconnected from Niederho-
fer's injury to relieve the railroad from liability, even under the slight
causation standard under FELA."'' .
Analogizing to an earlier case that had applied the relaxed
standard, McDonald v Northeast Illinois Regional,"6 the Niederhofer
court defended its finding of insufficient causation: "[T]he defend-
ants' alleged negligence merely created the preceding situation- it did
111 2011 Ill App Unpub LEXIS 2644.
112 Id at *2.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Niederhofer, 2011 111 App Unpub LEXIS 2644 at *4.
116 249 F Supp 2d 1051 (ND I11 2003).
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not cause the plaintiffs' injuries; intervening actions and forces sepa-
rate the defendants' negligent acts from the plaintiffs' injuries... 7
The court considered the disconnect between the injury in Niederho-
fer as being analogous to the disconnect in Nicholson and held that
"the common sense limitation on causation" prevents such cases
from moving forward.'8
In McDonald, on which Niederhofer relied, the court held that
there was no causal connection where an employee twisted his ankle
after helping remove a forklift from the snow."9 The facts of this case
are fairly simple: One of the railroad's employees negligently drove a
forklift into the snow where it became stuck. The plaintiff assisted in
pushing the forklift out of the snow. After the forklift was free, the
plaintiff tripped on his apron and twisted his ankle. The plaintiff ar-
gued that if not for the fact that the forklift was negligently driven
and stuck in the snow, he would not have tripped on his apron. The
court denied causation, holding that "[iut is clear that the improper
use of the forklift is irrelevant. . .. Plaintiff's only link to the inju-
ry... is that the operation of the forklift preceded his injury. This is
not a legally recognized concept of causation.' 2.
The Niederhofer court, and the earlier McDonald case it analo-
gized to, applied the relaxed standard of causation using what ap-
pears to be the common law doctrine of remoteness. Courts applying
the remoteness doctrine employ the same language the Niederhofer
and McDonald courts did when noting that the negligence "merely
created the preceding situation" for an injury to occur."'
What is left unclear with this analysis is how the court's applica-
tion of the remoteness doctrine fits with the McBride jurisprudence
in a way that courts can consistently apply to future cases. Is the test
of remoteness the same for traditional proximate cause as it is for the
relaxed standard? Is the court here simply saying that remoteness is
a component of proximate cause that carries through in the McBride
formulation? Or did the courts simply use common sense to deter-
mine that these cases were too remote to justify liability even under
a relaxed version of remoteness? Because these courts applied a fa-
miliar proximate cause test, it is difficult to know what made the test
117 Niederhoffer, 2011 I11 App Unpub LEXIS 2644 at *4 (emphasis added).
118 Id at *4-5.
119 McDonald, 249 F Supp 2d at 1056.
120 Id.
121 See, for example, Dixon v Kentucky Utilities Co, 174 SW2d 19, 21 (Ky App 1943) (re-
quiring that the negligence of a defendant needs to do more "than merely furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible"); Louisville & N. R. Co v
Napier, 3 SW2d 1070, 1071 (Ky App 1928).
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relaxed, and how the principle might apply in a future case where the
analogy is not quite as strong.
2. Murphy and Page: "Within the risk" as freestanding
negligence.
Two courts have applied the relaxed standard of causation post-
McBride by drawing on a test developed in the Sixth Circuit. In do-
ing so, both courts noted that the Sixth Circuit had previously devel-
oped a "within the risk" approach to applying a relaxed standard un-
der Rogers, and that this test remained applicable after McBride.
a) Pre-McBride: The Richards case. To reach their decisions
after McBride, two courts looked at Richards v Consolidated Rail
Corp, a Sixth Circuit case decided under the relaxed standard of cau-
sation before McBride." In Richards, the plaintiff was a conductor
who injured his back while attempting to determine why the train's
automatic emergency air braking system had caused the train to un-
expectedly stop." To do so, the plaintiff was required to walk along-
side the ballast "inspecting for visible causes" of the emergency
braking.'2" During his inspection, Richards slipped and hurt his
back. After the pain subsided, he finished his inspection and, finding
nothing, concluded that the emergency brake was likely caused by a
defective control valve (the "kicker").'
Under the relaxed standard of causation, the Richards court
held that a reasonable jury could find that the defective kicker
"played any part, even the slightest, in bringing about the plaintiff's
injury. 1 2' This meant, according to the court, that "a reasonable jury
could find that the plaintiff's injury was within the risk created by the
defective appliance."2 7 In this case, the "risk" created by the defec-
tive kicker included the fact that a conductor would have to walk the
train, and an injury resulting from doing so is therefore within the
risk created by the defective kicker.'
2
1
Explaining what it means for an injury to be "within the risk"
created by the negligence, the court said, "[I]f as a result of [the neg-
ligence] a plaintiff is required to take certain actions and he or she is
injured while taking those actions, the issue of causation generally
122 Richards, 330 F3d at 433.
123 Id at 431.
124 Id (noting that this procedure-referred to as "walking the train"-is part of the con-
ductor's duty).
125 Richards, 330 F3d at 431.
126 Id at 437.
127 Id (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
128 Id.
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should be submitted to the jury.' ' .9 The key point here is that as long
as the conductor was required to go outside, anything that happens
to him can be traced back to the negligently maintained brakes, and
under the Sixth Circuit's "within the risk" analysis, the railroad can
be held liable for whatever injury occurs.
b) Applying Richards after McBride. Two cases after McBride
looked at Richards to understand how to apply the relaxed standard
of causation.
Without deciding whether the standard was met, the Eastern
District of Tennessee in Murphy v CSX Transportation, Inc3' dis-
cussed the relaxed standard of causation applicable in FELA cases.'3
Here the court made two observations: First, the court found that,
under McBride, a plaintiff does not have to establish that "the extent
of the injury or the manner in which it occurred was probable or
foreseeable.' '.2 The court explained that as long as the initial negli-
gence is established, traditional constraints on proximate cause that
consider whether the actual injury was foreseeable do not constrain
the causal analysis.' The second observation the court made is that
simple but-for causation is not enough to find a railroad liable. The
plaintiff is required to "show something more than 'but for' causa-
tion."" The "something" is determined by applying McBride's com-
mon sense constraint. The court then noted that the Sixth Circuit in
Richards created a test under the older Rogers relaxed standard that
asks "whether the plaintiff's injury was 'within the risk' created by
the negligence......
In Page v National Railroad Passenger Corp,"' the court applied
the relaxed standard of causation in a case where a police officer
employed by Amtrak was injured while removing a baggage cart
from a track. Part of Donzel Page's duties included removing obsta-
cles like the baggage cart that obstructed the railroad tracks. On this
particular day, a train was attempting to pull onto the track so that
passengers could load and unload, but a baggage cart had negligently
been left on the track. Because he was in a hurry to clear the baggage
cart ahead of the oncoming train, Page jumped off the platform and
129 Richards, 330 F3d at 437.
130 2011 WL 3881021 (ED Tenn).
131 See id at *4.
132 Id (quotation marks omitted), quoting McBride, 131 S Ct at 2643.
133 Murphy, 2011 WL 3881021 at *4 ("Once this freestanding negligence is established,
the plaintiff must show that his injury 'result[ed] in whole or in part from the negligence."').
134 Id.
135 Id, citing Szekeres v CSX Transportation, Inc, 617 F3d 424, 429 (6th Cir 2010).
136 28 A3d 60 (Md Ct Spec App 2011).
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onto the track rather than using the stairs or the ramp. '37 He landed
"a little off balance" and injured his hip.'"
Page alleged that Amtrak was negligent in its "failure to take
reasonable precautions to manage the baggage carts[, which] result-
ed in a baggage cart lying on a live track, thereby creating an unsafe
workplace."'3 He further argued that because his injury occurred
"while performing his duty of retrieving the cart from the track,
Amtrak's negligence played some role in causing his injuries.'"..Ap -
plying the relaxed standard of causation-which the Page court re-
ferred to as an "unexacting threshold" - the court held that the
plaintiff had met his burden of demonstrating that the employer's
negligence may have "played any part, even the slightest" in causing
the injury."'
Although the Page court was brief in its comparison to Richards,
leaving much of the analysis up to the reader, it is easy to see the
similarity between the conductor in Richards and the police officer in
Page. Just as the conductor in Richards was required as a result of
the negligence to venture outside and walk the train, the police of-
ficer in Page was required as a result of the negligence to hurriedly
retrieve the baggage cart from the tracks. Because Page injured him-
self while taking actions as a result of the defendant's negligence,
Page's injury could be considered "within the risk" of such negli-
gence. Under the Richards application of the relaxed standard, the
railroad's negligence could reasonably be the cause of the injury.
Reviewing a few post-McBride cases demonstrates the divergent
and potentially contradictory approaches courts have taken in apply-
ing the relaxed standard of causation. Niederhofer, the first case re-
viewed, refused to find causation after the employer's negligence
caused a truck to crash and the plaintiff was injured while stepping
out of the truck to examine the accident. If the Niederhofer court had
applied the relaxed standard similarly to Murphy and Page, though,
the case is an easy one to pass on to the jury. Because the plaintiff
was required to step out of the truck as a result of the negligence, it
137 Id at 62-63. According to the plaintiff's deposition, he dropped between four and five
feet to the tracks. The plaintiff said that his decision to jump off the platform rather than use
the ramps or stairs was "because he 'wanted to get the patrons off the train in a timely fashion'
to avoid a train delay." Id at 63.
138 Id.
139 Id at 64.
140 Page, 28 A3d at 64.
141 Id at 62.
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easily falls within the Richards concept of "within the risk" that
Murphy endorsed and Page relied on.
The difficulty arises from ambiguity in the McBride Court's ref-
erence to common sense. The common sense of the Niederhofer
court led to one line of analysis, whereas the common sense of the
Murphy and Page courts led to another. This Comment presents a
first step in developing a more coherent account of the relaxed
standard of causation.
B. Fuzziness and Freestanding Negligence: The Problems Post-
McBride
McBride presents two difficulties for lower courts. The first dif-
ficulty is that courts relying solely on "common sense" as the limit on
liability apply a standard that appears almost identical to traditional
proximate cause. The second difficulty is what the court in Murphy
deemed "freestanding negligence," or the idea that once negligence
has been established, the railroad can be held liable for virtually any
resulting harm.
This Comment argues that these problems might be remedied
by giving courts clear standards or tests that can be consistently ap-
plied by different courts and that are permissible under the McBride
Court's explanation of the relaxed standard. Before offering one
such test that succeeds in permissibly excluding many far-fetched
cases, this Section examines more closely the difficulties arising post-
McBride.
1. Muddying the water between proximate and relaxed
causation.
As explained above, the courts in Niederhofer and McDonald
held that the railroads were not liable for the plaintiffs' injuries be-
cause their negligence merely created a situation in which an injury
might occur. These courts found that the causal chain lacked a cer-
tain directness; the negligence was too attenuated from the injury.'
The problem with this approach is that it is too difficult to de-
termine where the line between traditional proximate cause and the
relaxed standard is. The standard the courts employ in their anal-
yses-that the negligence "merely created the preceding situation"
for an injury to occur-derives from common law doctrines of re-
moteness used in determinations of proximate cause.'3 The court in
142 See text accompanying note 121.
143 See note 121.
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Niederhofer appeared to apply this doctrine in a more relaxed way,
but the only thing that appears to distinguish a relaxed version of
"remoteness" from a traditional version of "remoteness" is common
sense-an undefined standard that could easily vary from court to
court.
The McBride dissent feared that, without a clearer standard
than "common sense," courts would have trouble limiting liability.'"
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argued that one of the primary
benefits of the evolution of proximate cause as a doctrine is that it
provides courts with a certain vocabulary to describe how the
boundaries of liability will be drawn.'" As Chief Justice Roberts
wrote,
Proximate cause supplies the vocabulary for answering such
questions. It is useful to ask whether the injury that resulted was
within the scope of the risk created by the defendant's negligent
act; whether the injury was a natural or probable consequence
of the negligence; whether there was a superseding or interven-
ing cause; whether the negligence was anything more than an an-
tecedent event without which the harm would not have occurred.'"
The argument here is simply this: if courts rely only on their
common sense in deciding when to limit liability, it is likely that they
will resort to the familiar language of proximate cause, as the Nie-
derhofer and McDonald courts demonstrate. When this is the case, it
is unclear where the line is between the relaxed standard and more
traditional proximate cause. The analysis the Niederhofer and
McDonald courts engaged in is distinctly a common law proximate
cause analysis, yet the courts gave little indication as to how their use
of the doctrine was significantly different than how it would have
been applied under proximate cause.
It might be the case, for instance, that the doctrine of remote-
ness is particularly well suited for application to the relaxed standard
of causation. Or it might be that the courts in Niederhofer and
McDonald were applying a relaxed version of remoteness using their
common sense to limit liability. Whichever the case might be, what
the courts have done here is say that they are relaxing the standard
while giving little indication as to how or why their analysis is in fact
relaxed.
144 McBride, 131 S Ct at 2651 (Roberts dissenting).
145 Id at 2652.
146 Id (emphasis added).
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This is the peril of a standard based on common sense rather
than a clear set of rules or tests. It is not the case that courts must
give up every way of thinking about causation they have used in the
past (such as remoteness), but it is the case that courts need to be
able to articulate how and why use of a test that was traditionally
part of proximate cause is justified and applicable under the McBride
relaxed standard.
2. Runaway train: The problem of freestanding negligence.
"Freestanding negligence" is the idea that once a negligent act is
established, the negligent actor can be liable for any resulting harm."7
In McBride, the dissent argued that the language adopted by the ma-
jority leads to freestanding negligence, and freestanding negligence
leads to limitless liability."
As noted above, the Court in McBride affirmed a previous deci-
sion holding that, although foreseeability of harm is an element of
negligence under FELA, neither the extent nor the manner of the
harm must be foreseeable. ' The dissent argued that such an applica-
tion of foreseeability leads to limitless liability because as long as a
negligent act is the but-for cause of the ultimate injury, the railroad
may be held liable."
Applying the relaxed standard of causation has led the Sixth
Circuit to the very problem the dissent in McBride worried about.
The Sixth Circuit held in Richards that the relaxed standard of causa-
tion is governed by a "within the risk" analysis-a doctrine that tra-
ditionally asks whether the injury was within the foreseeable risks
that made the act negligent in the first place.' Interpreting the Rich-
ards test in light of McBride led the court in Murphy to adopt what
looks like this limitless concept of freestanding negligence.
According to Richards, an injury is "within the risk" of the neg-
ligence "if as a result of [the negligence] a plaintiff is required to take
certain actions and he or she is injured while taking those actions.'. 2
In Richards, because the conductor was required to walk along the
147 The court in Murphy used the term "freestanding negligence" to describe the interac-
tion between negligence and causation in FELA cases. The Murphy court did not explicitly
hold that "any" resulting harm is actionable, and thus, this Comment's use of the term "free-
standing negligence" differs slightly from how the Murphy court described it. As argued in this
Section, though, this definition is the implication of the language used in Murphy and Richards.
148 McBride, 131 S Ct at 2652 (Roberts dissenting).
149 See Part I1.B.1. See also McBride, 131 S Ct at 2643.
150 McBride, 131 S Ct at 2651 (Roberts dissenting).
151 See Abraham, The Forms and Functions of Tort Law at 126 (cited in note 5).
152 Richards, 330 F3d at 437.
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train, any accident that occurred while doing so was "within the risk"
of the negligence.' Notably, this explanation of the "within the risk"
doctrine is not consistent with its traditional formulation. Tradition-
ally, the "within the risk" test is a form of foreseeability analysis.'
The harm is within the risk of the negligence if it is the type of antic-
ipated harm that made the action negligent in the first place."5 The
relaxed standard of causation, however, cannot depend on this sort
of foreseeability analysis, and the Richards test does not look like a
traditional "within the risk" analysis. Rather than asking if it was the
type of anticipated harm that made the action negligent in the first
place, the Richards court simply considered whether the injury oc-
curred while the plaintiff was taking required actions as a result of
the negligence.
Suppose that the conductor was not walking up and down dan-
gerous hills but was instead walking across flatland and tripped over
his own shoelaces. Is the railroad's negligence the cause of the con-
ductor tripping? Or suppose even more dramatically that while walk-
ing the train, an earthquake hits causing the train to topple over. The
conductor is injured by flying debris. Did the railroad's negligence
cause the injury? According to the Sixth Circuit's "within the risk"
analysis, any injury resulting while the conductor is walking the train
is recoverable.
Common sense would lead many to object to the claim that the
railroad's negligence caused these injuries, but the problem of free-
standing negligence-as apparently embraced by courts applying the
Sixth Circuit's "within the risk" standard -might lead to such a result.
Further complicating the matter is the fact that freestanding
negligence appears directly at odds with the applications of the re-
laxed standard of causation by the Niederhofer and McDonald
courts. If a court applied the Richards test, the plaintiff in Niederho-
fer should recover: the railroad's negligence caused the crash, and
the plaintiff injured himself while getting out of the truck to inspect
his vehicle and report to his boss on the damage. Just as predicted,
relying solely on common sense has led these courts to apply incon-
sistent standards.
The two problems addressed in this Section-which compound
into a third problem of inconsistent rulings-can be remedied by ar-
ticulating clear standards or tests for determining causation that are
justified under the McBride holding. In the following Part, this
153 See id.
154 See Abraham, The Forms and Functions of Tort Law at 126 (cited in note 5).
155 See id.
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Comment begins the process of understanding the relaxed standard
by offering one such test that is permissible under the jurisprudence
of McBride and allows courts to exclude a significant amount of far-
fetched cases from the jury.
IV. A CAUSAL-LINK APPROACH TO THE RELAXED STANDARD
The court in Nicholson commented on the importance of devel-
oping a rule for understanding the relaxed standard of causation, just
as courts developed rules for understanding traditional proximate
cause. 56 This Comment provides a first step toward formulating a co-
herent understanding of the McBride relaxed standard of causation.
To achieve that end, this Comment argues that courts should apply
the "causal-link analysis" used in common law cases of coincidental
harm to exclude a significant number of far-fetched cases from mov-
ing to a jury. Using this analysis reaches the same results that Justice
Ginsburg articulated in McBride but offers something more than
''common sense" as the limiter to a causal connection.
Part IV.A argues that the causal-link analysis courts use when
considering cases of coincidental harm is a useful way of conceiving
of a place between but-for causation and traditional proximate
cause. Part IV.B describes how the causal-link analysis fits within the
goals of the McBride standard because it analytically falls between
freestanding negligence and proximate cause. Further, the analysis
stays true to the Court's explanation of the role of foreseeability un-
der FELA. Finally, Part IV.C demonstrates that the causal-link anal-
ysis reaches the appropriate results in FELA cases by allowing courts
to withhold from the jury cases like Nicholson and Moody while al-
lowing findings of liability in cases like Gallick and Richards. This
Part concludes by showing that the causal-link analysis prevents find-
ings of liability in the more far-fetched hypotheticals posed by the
dissent in McBride.
A. The Causal-Link Analysis
The McBride Court explained that the relaxed standard of cau-
sation lies somewhere between what this Comment refers to as free-
standing negligence and traditional proximate cause. To better un-
derstand this, one should consider tort liability as requiring various
thresholds that incrementally limit the scope of liability. At the bot-
tom of the list is but-for causation. A system could be structured so
that parties are held liable for any harm that they are the but-for
156 See Nicholson, 253 F2d at 941.
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cause of, regardless of whether their action is negligent. This would
be a system of strict liability. A stricter threshold is the requirement
of negligence. Negligence requires courts to assess the duty of a par-
ty based on what harms a reasonable person would anticipate."' By
considering whether an actor was negligent, a court narrows the
scope of potentially actionable harms. Rather than just considering
whether the actor was a but-for cause of the injury, the court consid-
ers whether the actor's negligence was the but-for cause of an injury.'
Considering only negligence and but-for causation creates what
this Comment has referred to as freestanding negligence. Under tra-
ditional common law, courts are unwilling to adopt freestanding neg-
ligence, and proximate cause exists as a threshold that further nar-
rows the range of injuries for which a party may be held liable.'
One type of case where courts have intervened to limit liability
based solely on the actor's negligence being the but-for cause of
harm is one of coincidental harm. The principle is best illustrated by
a case-Berry v Sugar Notch Borough." There, a driver was negli-
gently speeding when a tree was blown over by a stormy wind, caus-
ing it to fall on his car.'6' The driver sued the borough for negligently
allowing the tree to stand in a dangerous condition on the highway,
but the borough argued that the driver's negligence in speeding
caused the accident and barred recovery. The driver's negligence in
this case was indeed a but-for cause: if the driver had been driving
the speed limit, his car would not have been at the place where the
tree fell at the time it fell. Despite the fact that the driver's negligent
speeding was the but-for cause of the accident, the court held that it
cannot "be said that the speed was the cause of the accident.'
6 2
Berry is a classic illustration of the coincidence principle." When
assessing the causation element of a tort, courts are unwilling to im-
pose liability when the injury is coincidental.'" As the court in Berry
noted, "[t]hat his speed brought him to the place of the accident at
the moment of the accident was the merest chance, and a thing which
157 See Gallick, 372 US at 117; Palsgraf v Long Island R. Co, 162 NE 99, 100 (NY 1928)
("The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports rela-
tion.").
158 See Abraham, The Forms and Functions of Tort Law at 103 (cited in note 5) (explain-
ing that plaintiffs in tort must prove that the defendant's negligence was the cause of the injury
in the suit).
159 Id at 124-25.
160 43 A 240 (Pa 1899).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 See Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 504 (Aspen 9th ed 2008).
164 See id.
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no foresight could have predicted.""'6 In other words, the driver's neg-
ligent speed had no effect on the chance that the injury would have
occurred.'" Driving more negligently would have prevented the inju-
ry just as much as driving less negligently, and from an ex ante per-
spective, the appropriate speed to drive to avoid injury is impossible
to predict.'7
The type of analysis in Berry and other coincidental cases has
been referred to as the causal-link argument and is one of many tests
courts use in making broader decisions about proximate cause.' " The
causal-link analysis says that a person's negligence is not the cause of
an injury unless recurrence of the negligence actually increases the
chance that harm will occur.' 9 In other words, a court applying a
causal-link analysis asks whether the risk of the injury that occurred
was increased ex ante by the negligent act. Berry provides a helpful
illustration: the driver in Berry could not know ex ante whether his
negligently fast driving would increase the chance that a tree would
fall on his car, and so the negligence was not the legal cause of the
injury.
The causal-link argument is based on a theory of foreseeability
but not necessarily the same concept of foreseeability that arises un-
der traditional proximate cause. In Berry, the fact that "no foresight
could have predicted" the accident made the court hesitant to find a
causal link.' ° Commentators couch the argument as whether recur-
rence of the negligence would increase the risk of the same injury.''
This requires a court to engage in a type of foreseeability analysis
but, as will be examined below, leaves open the possibility that the
causal link still exists even for highly unforeseeable injuries.
165 Berry, 43 A at 240 (emphasis added).
166 See Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts at 503 (cited in note 163) (emphasis added).
167 See Berry, 43 A at 240 ("The same thing might as readily have happened to a car run-
ning slowly, or it might have been that a high speed alone would have carried him beyond the
tree to a place of safety.").
168 See, for example, Ariel Porat, Expanding Liability for Negligence Per Se, 44 Wake
Forest L Rev 979, 987 (2009) (noting that a causal-link requirement restricts liability more than
but-for causation does by itself); Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An
Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U Chi L Rev 69, 71 (1975) (arguing that a "causal link" exists
when "recurrence of that act or activity will increase the chances that the injury will also oc-
cur"). See also Epstein, Torts § 10.7 at 260-62 (cited in note 16) (explaining how courts ap-
proach coincidental harm in making proximate cause determinations).
169 See Porat, Expanding Liability at 987-88 (cited in note 168); Calabresi, 43 U Chi L
Rev at 71 (cited in note 168).
170 Berry, 43 A at 240.
171 See, for example, Porat, 44 Wake Forest L Rev at 987 (cited in note 168); Calabresi, 43
U Chi L Rev at 71 (cited in note 168).
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B. How the Causal-Link Analysis Aligns with McBride
In McBride, the Court suggested that between but-for causation
and traditional proximate cause lies a realm of relaxed causation:
FELA proximate cause.'72 This Section argues that causal-link analy-
sis fits within that realm and matches the understanding of foreseea-
bility in FELA cases articulated by McBride.
1. The causal-link analysis is one missing piece between
freestanding negligence and proximate cause.
Applying the Rogers standard, the McBride Court held that be-
tween the threshold of freestanding negligence and proximate cause
there is a relaxed standard of causation. The relaxed standard of cau-
sation is something more than merely showing that a party's negli-
gence was the but-for cause of an injury but something less than the
more stringent standards of traditional proximate cause.'73 On the
lower end of the spectrum, cases like Nicholson ("the bathroom
case") and Moody ("the heart attack case") exemplify instances
where a defendant's negligence meets the lower threshold of free-
standing negligence but does not meet the requirements for the re-
laxed standard of causation. Gallick ("the insect bite case") and
Richards ("the brakes case"), on the other hand, demonstrate how
the relaxed standard of causation allows for liability where proxi-
mate cause would not. There are two standards, then, to measure the
strength of the causal-link analysis as a way to apply the relaxed
standard. First, the causal-link analysis cannot bar cases like Gallick
and Richards, which the Court has indicated should proceed to a ju-
ry. Second, the argument for using the causal-link analysis is
strengthened if it also explains why cases like Nicholson and Moody
should not move to a jury.
The causal-link analysis analytically falls between traditional
proximate cause and freestanding negligence -exactly how the
McBride Court explained that courts should conceive of the relaxed
standard of causation. When courts find a lack of a causal link, they
acknowledge that the actor's negligence was the but-for cause of the
injury'74 but need not consider inquiries more related to traditional
172 See McBride, 131 S Ct at 2641.
173 Id at 2643.
174 See Porat, 44 Wake Forest L Rev at 987 (cited in note 168) (noting that "the fact that
the wrongdoing in question was a 'but-for' cause of the harm that actually materialized is not
sufficient to establish a causal relationship between the act and the harm").
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proximate cause, such as whether the injury was the foreseeable re-
sult from the negligence.'
Further, the causal-link analysis does not implicate the compo-
nents of traditional proximate cause that the McBride majority most
firmly rejected: causal foreseeability. "6 The jury instructions that
CSX pushed for and McBride rejected focused on the traditional as-
pects of proximate cause requiring a jury to assess the directness and
foreseeability of the harm.' Although the causal-link analysis is a
component of traditional proximate cause, it is analytically distinct
from the more prominent doctrines that McBride rejected. Given
that the Court in McBride held that the relaxed standard is a form of
proximate cause, the question is not whether the causal-link analysis
is something separate from proximate cause entirely, but rather
whether it conforms with the requirements of the relaxed standard
set forth in McBride. This Section and the following Section demon-
strate that it does.
2. The causal-link analysis matches McBride's understanding
of foreseeability under FELA.
After establishing that the causal-link analysis analytically fits
within the relaxed standard of causation, the second question is
whether applying the causal-link analysis maps onto the McBride ex-
planation of foreseeability. In McBride, the Court held that foresee-
ability of harm remains a part of the negligence inquiry but that in
determining questions of causation, courts should not bar recovery
for injuries that occur in an unforeseeable manner or to an unfore-
seeable extent.
A negligent act will increase the risk of a certain class of harms
occurring. For instance, suppose a person negligently causes a car to
run off the road. After the accident, a passenger in the car walks up
the road to warn oncoming traffic and is struck by a car and injured.
Although the manner in which this harm occurred might be considered
175 See Epstein, Torts §§ 10.7, 10.9, 10.12 at 260-62, 263-64, 269-72 (cited in note 16 ) (de-
scribing the causal-link analysis in cases of coincidental harm as a separate inquiry from other
traditional components of proximate cause such as "directness and foresight" and "foreseeabil-
ity"). One scholar has gone so far as to argue that the causal-link analysis is an analytically sep-
arate question from proximate cause. See Calabresi, 43 U Chi L Rev at 71-72 (cited in note
168) (describing causal-link analysis as based on whether an act increases the likelihood of a
particular injury will occur and describing proximate cause as a conclusion that the tort system
should allow recovery).
176 For elaboration on this point, see Part II.B.1.
177 See Part II.
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unforeseeable, a court could reasonably determine that the negligent
driving increased the risk that it would happen. "'
This example perfectly captures how the causal-link analysis
conforms to the McBride explanation of foreseeability under FELA.
Marshall v Nugent,' from which these facts derive, has been cited as
an example of the causal-link analysis in action.' Despite the fact
that the accident might have happened in an unforeseeable manner,
the injury was still of the type made riskier by the negligent act, so it
fell within the scope of liability created by the causal-link analysis.
This demonstrates how the causal-link analysis in practice stays true
to the McBride requirement that the relaxed standard of causation
need not consider whether the manner of harm was foreseeable. If
this case arose under FELA, a court should find that because the risk
of the injury occurring was increased by the negligence, the defend-
ant could be held liable under the relaxed standard of causation.
Courts need not look beyond FELA for an example of what the
McBride Court meant when it held that the extent of harm need not
be foreseeable. In Gallick, the plaintiff was bitten by an insect and
ultimately had both of his legs amputated. Here, the extent of harm
was highly unforeseeable-it is not likely that an insect bite would
result in amputation-but the Court still found that the railroad
could be held liable under the relaxed standard of causation.'1 Using
the causal-link analysis, it is clear that the employees are at an in-
creased risk of being bitten by an infected insect when asked to work
near pools of stagnant water that were allowed to attract vermin for
years. Thus, the act increased the risk of the injury that occurred, and
the railroad might be held liable under the causal-link analysis re-
gardless of how unforeseeable the extent of the injury was. In this
way, the causal-link analysis allows a case like Gallick to proceed to
the jury, consistent with McBride's explanation of the role of fore-
seeability under the relaxed standard.
C. The Causal-Link Analysis Reaches Common Sense Results
This Section demonstrates how the causal-link analysis will
reach common sense results in FELA cases by applying it to the cas-
es previously discussed. It then reviews the more absurd hypothetical
cases proposed by the dissent in McBride, showing how the causal-link
178 See Abraham, The Forms and Functions of Tort Law at 139-40 (cited in note 5). The
hypothetical posed is taken from Marshall v Nugent, 222 F2d 604, 607-08 (1st Cir 1955).
179 222 F2d 604 (1st Cir 1955).
180 See Epstein, Torts § 10.7 at 261 (cited in note 16).
181 Gallick, 372 US at 120.
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analysis gives courts articulable reasons for denying liability in cases
of attenuated causation. Finally, this Comment ends by exploring if,
and when, a court might find a railroad liable when lightning strikes.
By going through these various cases and hypotheticals, the goal is to
demonstrate how the causal-link analysis is a useful tool for courts to
use to exclude at least one class of far-fetched cases from moving to a
jury while still permitting many of the cases to go forward that
McBride suggests should be captured.
1. Causal-link analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's
FELA jurisprudence.
a) The causal-link analysis reaches the results McBride re-
quires. The Nicholson case was offered by the McBride Court as an
exemplar of a case not meeting the relaxed standard of causation.' '
In Nicholson, the court found that negligently failing to provide a
women's restroom was not the cause of the plaintiff being knocked
over by a passenger's luggage." How would a causal-link analysis
apply in this case?
Failing to provide a women's restroom does not increase the risk
of being knocked over by a passenger's luggage. When the railroad
failed to provide a women's restroom, it increased the chance of
some injuries occurring, such as an injury from having to refrain
from using the restroom for an excessively long period of time be-
cause no restroom is available nearby. But failing to provide a re-
stroom does not increase the risk that someone will be injured from
being knocked over by bumping into someone.
In fact-just as in Berry-remedying the negligence could have
resulted in increasing the risk of the injury that ultimately occurred.
Suppose the railroad provided a women's restroom closer to the
shop but in a more crowded area. The railroad would have remedied
its negligence but actually increased the risk that a woman might get
knocked down and injured.
The corollary to this point, also made in Berry, is that it is possi-
ble that being even more negligent with respect to not providing a
women's restroom would not increase the risk at all-and would
perhaps decrease it. Suppose that in addition to not providing a
women's restroom at the store, the railroad did not permit its em-
ployees to use any of the train car restrooms, and women had to
travel back home to use the restroom. The likelihood of being
182 McBride, 131 S Ct at 2643.
183 Nicholson, 253 F2d at 941.
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knocked over by a passenger's luggage is significantly less likely in
the comfort of your own home, but the negligence of the railroad in
failing to provide a women's restroom has been made worse. This is
comparable to Berry, which noted that because driving more negli-
gently would decrease the chance of the tree falling on the car to the
same extent that driving less negligently would,'" there is no risk-
increasing relationship between what made the conduct negligent
and the ultimate harm that occurred.
The second case McBride pointed to as an exemplary represen-
tation of the relaxed standard of causation, Moody, is an even more
compelling example of why courts should use the causal-link analy-
sis. In Moody, the court denied causation under the Rogers test be-
cause the plaintiff failed to allege that his heart attack was the result
of a specific act of negligence rather than the "everyday experience"
associated with "the severe stress of work."'"5 The plaintiff worked
overtime on several occasions, but twelve days lapsed between his
last overtime shift and his heart attack. Also problematic was the fact
that the plaintiff's expert never argued that the specific effects of
overtime work caused the heart attack-instead arguing more gen-
erally that the stressful work environment was the cause." In other
words, according to the plaintiff's own expert the railroad's negli-
gence-working the plaintiff overtime -did not increase the risk that
this heart attack would occur twelve days later.
Consider Moody in this way: Working as a conductor comes
with a set of background risks that exist even if the railroad creates a
safe work environment. Those background risks include the risk of a
stress-induced heart attack. The railroad was negligent in requiring
Moody to work overtime, but Moody did not argue that the negli-
gence created any more risk of a heart attack than otherwise exists
due to the general stress associated with being a conductor. That is,
given that twelve days lapsed between working overtime and the ac-
tual heart attack, the negligent overworking of Moody did not make
having a heart attack any more likely relative to the background risks
already present when the railroad is not negligent.
Certainly it is conceivable that working someone overtime could
increase the risk of a heart attack. In this case, though, the heart attack
occurred twelve days later, when the risks created by that specific act
184 Berry, 43 A at 240 ("[l]t might have been that a high speed alone would have carried
him beyond the tree to a place of safety.").
185 Moody, 921 F2d at 5 (ruling that the plaintiff did not allege a particular event that ju-
rors could have causally connected to the injury "as a matter of everyday experience").
186 Id.
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of negligence had subsided, ' and the plaintiff's own expert admitted
as much by arguing that general work stress rather than the specific
negligence was the cause. Under the causal-link analysis, the fact that
the railroad's negligence did not make having a heart attack any riski-
er than it otherwise would be should lead a court to deny causation.
To further illustrate this point, Moody may be compared with
another case where the causal-link analysis finds liability. In Hines v
Garrett,'" a railroad negligently dropped the plaintiff off at the wrong
stop, and she was raped twice while waking through the woods to her
intended destination. In this case, the railroad's negligence increased
the risk of her being raped because it put her in a much more dan-
gerous situation than if she had been dropped off close to her hotel.
Suppose, though, that the plaintiff had not been raped and reached
her hotel safely. The excess risk created by the railroad's negligence
would subside, and if she was raped while staying in the hotel the
railroad would not be held liable. Similarly, working the plaintiff
overtime in Moody created excess risk that a heart attack would oc-
cur, but that excess risk subsided when the plaintiff was able to rest
without working overtime for twelve days. Once the excess risk dis-
sipates, the background risks return to neutral just as the case would
have been had the plaintiff in Hines made it safely to the hotel.
b) The causal-link analysis is a useful tool for the post-
McBride courts in applying the relaxed standard. The causal-link
analysis resolves some problems courts have had in applying the re-
laxed standard of causation after McBride. The Niederhofer and
McDonald courts held that the causation element was lacking be-
cause the negligence of the railroad merely created the circumstanc-
es for an accident to occur. As argued above, this analysis was diffi-
cult to square with Richards, where the court held that because the
plaintiff was duty-bound to walk alongside the train as a result of the
railroad's negligence, any resulting injury incurred while performing
his duty was actionable. The causal-link analysis provides courts with
a method of analyzing these cases that is consistent with the holding
of McBride and does not lead to contradictory results.
Remember that in McDonald the plaintiff slipped on the ground
after helping to push a forklift that was stuck in the snow and ice,
and in Niederhofer the plaintiff jammed his knee after stepping out
187 The causal-link, analysis presumes that when risks are increased, they will eventually
subside and the background risks resume. See Epstein, Torts § 10.7 at 261 (cited in note 16)
(comparing harms a defendant may be liable for when the "dangerous situation" still exists
with harms that occur after the risks have subsided).
188 108 SE 690 (Va 1921).
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of a truck that had crashed due to snow and ice. Under the causal-
link analysis, the risk of the ultimate injury was not increased in Nie-
derhofer or McDonald, but it was in Richards.
The plaintiff in McDonald would not have been walking away
from the forklift if not for the negligence of the railroad, but because
the plaintiff did not slip on any snow or ice, the negligence of the
railroad did not increase the risk of him slipping. That is, there was
nothing inherently riskier about walking where the plaintiff was
when he fell than at any other time or place he might have been
walking-it was just as likely that the plaintiff would trip over his
apron regardless of whether the snow had caused the forklift to
crash. ' Further, even if the railroad had been more negligent and let
snow and ice accumulate for days, the likelihood of the injury would
not have been increased.
Similarly, the plaintiff in Niederhofer did not face an increased
risk from stepping out of his truck because of the accident. This case
is not as clear-cut as McDonald, where the relationship between
slipping on one's apron is easily divorced from the snow and ice on
the ground. It is arguable that the snow did increase the risk of injury
by making the crash itself more likely, which in turn led to the plain-
tiff stepping out of his car and hurting his knee.
The stronger argument, though, is that stepping out of one's
truck an additional time under non-risky conditions' should not be
said to have increased the risk of injury relative to the background
risks of this type of employment. An employee who drives trucks
likely steps in and out of his truck many times a day-a number of
times that likely varies from day to day. A realistic background risk
associated with this job, then, is that you will enter and exit the truck
under conditions that have a certain degree of safety but not that you
will get in and out of your truck a specific number of times. Another
way to say this is that under non-negligent working conditions, a
truck driver's job contains the background risks of getting in and out
of his truck a variable number of times depending on the day's tasks.
Having to get out of the truck one more time does not increase the
risk associated with the employee's job generally, so long as the act
of getting in and out of the truck is not made riskier.
189 It should be noted that nothing in the facts of this case suggests the negligence made it
more likely that the plaintiff would trip on his apron-for instance, by making his apron come
untied.
190 By "non-risky conditions" it is meant that there was nothing riskier about the activity
of stepping out of the truck than otherwise would exist. A risky condition, for instance, might
be if the snow had made the step slippery or the crash had damaged one of the steps, making it
harder to walk on.
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It is easy to imagine a situation where the crash did make getting
into and out of the truck riskier. Suppose that the crash caused a
safety rail or step to be damaged, making it harder to use. Or sup-
pose that the crash happened in an area where there was loose gravel
that was hard to land on safely rather than sturdy cement on which
the truck would normally park. In these situations, the crash un-
doubtedly made getting in and out of the truck a riskier enterprise,
and thus the background risks the truck driver typically faced were
increased.
One counterargument might be to say that the railroad in Nie-
derhofer did increase the risk because, when the distance of the step
was changed from twenty to eight inches, the risk of injury was in-
creased because the changed condition is what caused the employee
to misjudge the distance to the ground and jam his knee. It is not
clear, though, that just because the condition changed it was riskier.
Arguably, the fact that the truck's step was only eight inches-rather
than twenty-from the ground made stepping off the truck less risky.
Whichever way a court decides this issue, though, the causal-link
analysis is a significant tool because it gives a court a method to make
the decision that is understandable to parties who need to modify
their behavior to conform to the law. Rather than relying solely on a
common sense judgment that might differ from court to court, the
causal-link analysis gives courts one method of analyzing the issue
consistently from one case to another.
In Richards the plaintiff's risk of injury was increased by the
negligence. If the brakes had not been negligently maintained, the
plaintiff would have never had to walk the rough terrain to search
for the problem. Unlike in McDonald and Niederhofer, where the in-
juries resulted from risks that existed regardless of the railroad's neg-
ligence, the risks that caused the injury only arose because of the
negligence-without the negligence, the plaintiff would have stayed
in the train and never have ventured outside. The negligent mainte-
nance of the brakes caused it to stop, which required the conductor
to walk alongside the train in potentially hazard-ridden terrain,
which increased risks of injury relative to non-negligent maintenance
of the brakes. Even if the accident were highly unlikely, the risk of
the accident occurring was increased relative to the circumstances if
the railroad had not been negligent because the conductor would
have never been exposed to the rough, outside terrain.'
191 It is worth noting that the analysis here, and in discussing the other cases, is con-
strained by the limited facts available. In litigating the Richards case, for instance, one might
argue that the excess risk created by the negligence was neutralized by the risks the conductor
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Distinguishing Richards from Niederhofer is useful for under-
standing how a court should use the causal-link analysis in these cas-
es. Niederhofer found that there was no increased risk despite the
fact that the injury occurred only because the plaintiff was required
to step out of the truck after the accident occurred. In Richards,
however, the court found that when the conductor was required to
walk his train the negligence did increase the risk. The key distinc-
tion here is that the act of getting in and out of the truck in Niederho-
fer was no riskier because the plaintiff did it after the accident than it
would have been in any of the other circumstances where getting in
and out of a truck is an activity contained within the background lev-
el of risks. The conductor, on the other hand, was exposed to an en-
tire class of risks by being forced to walk alongside the train in a
rough, unknown terrain, and his injury was the result of one of those
risks. If Niederhofer had to exit his truck on a terrain where his risk
of injury was increased beyond the background risks (ignored by the
law) associated with getting in and out of an otherwise safe truck, it
would be more like Richards, and a court should send it to the jury.
2. Revisiting the hot coffee hypothetical.
Returning to the hypothetical posed by the dissent in McBride is
a useful way to explore why the fears of unlimited liability can be
curbed in a way that still significantly relaxes traditional proximate
cause. The dissent's hypothetical is as follows: Suppose a railroad
mechanic is required to repair a boiler that was malfunctioning due
to the railroad's negligence and, because of excessive heat, removes
his coat while he is working. The mechanic later goes to drink some
coffee from his thermos but spills it on his arm causing a severe burn.
If the mechanic had not removed his coat to fix the boiler, the coffee
would have been absorbed by his sleeve rather than his arm. Is the
railroad liable for his injury, which resulted from its negligent
maintenance of the boiler?"n
Applying the causal-link analysis to this case, the court could
find that the railroad's negligence was not the cause of the injury.
The negligent maintenance of the boiler did not result in an in-
creased risk that a maintenance worker would spill coffee on himself
and burn his arm.
otherwise avoided. Such would be the case if walking up and down the hills were no more risky
than walking through the narrow corridors on the train. Without more facts, it is a reasonable
assumption that climbing up and down hills poses risks that would not be neutralized by a con-
ductor otherwise sitting in a train.
192 See McBride, 131 S Ct at 2652 (Roberts dissenting).
2012] 1549
The University of Chicago Law Review
It might be argued that the risk of burning oneself with hot cof-
fee is higher when wearing short sleeves as opposed to a coat, and
therefore the risk of injury was increased by the overheating boiler.
While it is true that one is more likely to be burned when coffee is
spilled on bare arms rather than covered arms, such an argument is a
misapplication of the causal-link analysis.
Consider the hypothetical in the following way. The overheating
boiler increases the probability that the repairman will remove his
coat. At the same time, however, the overheating boiler decreases
the probability that the repairman will drink a hot cup of coffee ca-
pable of burning him when spilled. After all, if the excess heat is ac-
tually causing the repairman to overheat to the extent that he would
remove his coat, it becomes much less likely that he would drink
something that hot at all. What this means is that although the
chance of being burned was increased if the repairman decides to
drink coffee, that excess risk would be neutralized by the simultane-
ous decrease in the chance that the repairman would drink coffee at
all. The risk of actually spilling the coffee is neither increased nor de-
creased, but the risk of being burned when the boiler overheats is
balanced by the decreased likelihood that an overheated repairman
would drink something so hot.
The hypothetical can be further enhanced to demonstrate how
upon knowing more facts about the case the causal-link analysis
might come out differently. Suppose the railroad requires its repair-
men to wear long coats for protection from injury, and the overheat-
ing boiler made it dangerous not to keep the coat on. It might be ar-
gued that because the repairman had to remove his coat while
repairing the boiler, the railroad can be held liable, at least in part,
for harms against which the coat is normally designed to protect.
This is because the background risks are firmly established for this
employee as not including harms that the safety coat would protect
him from. If, on the other hand, the employee works in a variety of
locations and sometimes wears a coat but sometimes does not due to
personal preference about temperature, the case is harder to make.
The background risks associated with his job do not necessarily ex-
clude something like hot coffee spilling and burning him. Another
way the facts might be changed is by inquiring whether the railroad
is aware that its repairmen drink coffee on the job-perhaps it might
even supply it.
All of these changes in the hypothetical illustrate how knowing
what the background risks associated with the employee's job duties
are would affect a court's determination of whether the risk was
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actually increased -and thus whether the causal-link analysis would
find liability. The fact that hard cases exist-cases that really press
on the idea of whether or not risk was actually increased-is no
trouble. This Comment seeks to give courts one tool they can use to
coherently analyze the causation question, but it does not purport to
solve every difficult case that might arise under a myriad of factual
nuances.
In other words, the causal-link analysis is one method courts
might use to sever liability. Knowing this, parties can present coher-
ent arguments for their case, and courts can systematically consider,
in a consistent fashion, which cases ought to be dismissed under the
causal-link analysis. Some cases that go on to a jury might seem far-
fetched to those used to the more constrained limits of traditional
proximate cause, but the causal-link analysis provides a coherent
method to exclude at least one class of cases from moving forward in
a manner consistent with the more relaxed standard of McBride.
3. Richards redux: Are railroads liable when lightning strikes?
Dramatically asked, and perhaps timidly answered: Are rail-
roads liable when lightning strikes? The answer suggested by this
Comment is maybe. Consider a variation on Richards to understand
why this is the case.
If the plaintiff in Richards had been struck by lightning rather
than injuring his back, the causal-link analysis would allow for liabil-
ity. The negligence of the railroad would have forced the plaintiff to
walk the train, introducing him to a class of risks associated with
working outside, which he would not otherwise have been exposed
to. Even though a lightning strike is a highly unforeseeable manner
in which the risk manifested itself, the McBride standard-supported
in the causal-link analysis -does not limit liability based on an un-
foreseeable manner of injury. The fact that being struck by lightning
is an injury only possible if the plaintiff is outside walking, rather
than comfortably riding in the train, means that the railroad's negli-
gence increased the risk of the accident occurring.
But lightning strikes might not always be recoverable harm. Im-
agine the plaintiff in Richards is more like the plaintiff in Page, and it
is the job of the plaintiff to gather baggage carts left around the work
area. This is a job that requires working outside, which means the
plaintiff is exposed to the risk of being struck by lightning every day,
regardless of whether the railroad is negligent. Suppose a railroad
negligently leaves a baggage cart on the track, just as was done in
Page, and the plaintiff is struck by lightning while retrieving it. In this
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case, the negligence did not increase ex ante the risk of being struck
by lightning-it was just as likely that the plaintiff would have been
struck by lightning while gathering a non-negligently placed cart
from a different location. Further, if the railroad had been even more
negligent, leaving the cart in a more dangerous location, the plaintiff
would not have been in the same spot to be struck by lightning. In
this case, there would be no liability because the risk of being struck
by lightning would not be increased by the railroad's negligence.
A counterargument here might be that by leaving the cart on the
track, the railroad increased the time the employee would be out-
side, thus raising the risk of being struck by lightning. It seems un-
likely, though, that an employee whose job requires working outside
for varying lengths of time faces an increased risk of injury because
an employer negligently left a cart on the track. Consider the prob-
lem this way: If the employee had left the cart outside but not negli-
gently on the track, the plaintiff would be exposed to the same risks.
There is nothing about the negligence itself that created an
increased risk because the plaintiff worked outside regardless of
whether the employer was or was not negligent.
CONCLUSION
The causal-link analysis is a test courts can use to exclude at
least one class of cases that should not move forward under the re-
laxed standard. Analytically, this test fits comfortably between the
two extremes of requiring nothing more than but-for causation and
the traditional wealth of constraints present in proximate cause anal-
ysis. It allows courts to sever liability not based on foreseeability-as
McBride instructed-but it does not exclude any cases the Court has
indicated should be included. At the very worst, the causal-link
analysis might not be strict enough, but it presents courts with the
ability to exclude many far-fetched cases in a consistent and coherent
manner.
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